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EQUAL VOICE BY HALF MEASURES 
John Mark Hansen* † 
Introduction 
In democratic theory, the ballot is the most perfect expression of the 
democratic commitment to the moral equality of persons. Every citizen, 
whether old or young, rich or poor, sophisticated or simple, enjoys the same 
endowment in an election: a single vote. The ballot not only gives citizens 
their voice in government, it also makes their voices equal. 
In practice, however, democracies have erected all sorts of impediments 
to the ideal of equal voice, such as restrictions on suffrage, legislative 
malapportionments, and discriminatory gerrymanders. Among the most 
egregious impediments, however, are surely the systems of indirect election 
purported to filter and to refine the voice of the people. The Electoral Col-
lege is one such system. This Commentary examines the effects of that 
system and the proposed reforms to it on the prospect of equal voice in elec-
tions. 
I. The Electoral College Now 
The Electoral College effectively divides the selection of the president 
into fifty-one separate elections in the fifty states and the District of Colum-
bia. In every state except two, state electorates choose slates of electors 
pledged to support the winner of the statewide popular vote. Like all winner-
take-all electoral systems, the Electoral College is exceedingly responsive: 
small changes in voter support magnify into large mandates in the Electoral 
College. Moreover, like all electoral systems divided into geographic dis-
tricts, the Electoral College exhibits a representational bias, in that a 
candidate who falls well short of a majority of the popular vote can still win 
the presidency. Electoral College anomalies of this kind have occurred in 
four out of the fifty-five presidential elections held since 1789—and most 
recently in 2000. 
Because the number of electoral votes for each state equals the size of 
its congressional delegation and the House of Representatives is apportioned 
roughly in proportion to population, the weighting of votes in presidential 
elections is not as grossly unequal as in U.S. Senate elections, where a sin-
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gle voter in the least-populous state, Wyoming, has sixty-eight times the 
power of a voter in the most-populous state, California. But the inequality in 
the value of each vote in the Electoral College is still considerable. In the 
five states with the largest electorates, the number of residents of voting age 
per electoral vote ranges from 445,500 in Pennsylvania to 486,400 in Flor-
ida. Meanwhile, in the five least-populous states, the ratio of voting age 
population to electoral votes ranges from 124,300 in Wyoming to 160,700 in 
Vermont. Thus, in the Electoral College, a vote cast in a less populated state 
is worth three to four times as much as a vote cast in a highly populated 
state. Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not 
allow such extreme deviations from the “one person, one vote” standard in 
legislative apportionment, they are perfectly tolerated in the apportionment 
of the Electoral College. 
The Electoral College induces a second kind of inequality just as trou-
blesome as the first: inequality of attention. The political arithmetic of the 
Electoral College encourages presidential campaigns to focus their efforts 
on states with a close partisan balance, whether large or small in population. 
In recent years, Florida (twenty-seven electoral votes), Ohio (twenty), New 
Hampshire (four), and New Mexico (five) have been the object of much so-
licitous attention. Meanwhile, except for fundraising visits, campaigns have 
slighted California (fifty-five) and Texas (thirty-four). And it has been dec-
ades since presidential nominees waged a vigorous contest for Kansas (six) 
or Rhode Island (four). From March to October 2004, George W. Bush and 
John Kerry combined to make forty-nine visits to Ohio, forty-six to Florida, 
forty-one to Pennsylvania, thirty-four to Wisconsin, and twenty-six to 
Iowa—but the candidates visited California only eight times. In the same 
election, voters in twenty-eight states, including California, Texas, New 
York, Illinois, New Jersey, and Georgia, saw fewer than 100 campaign ad-
vertisements per month over the entire course of the campaign, while voters 
in the swing states viewed an order of magnitude more. Judging by the two 
campaigns’ efforts, a majority of the 200 million citizens eligible to vote in 
2004 were not seriously solicited for their votes. 
The inequality of attention has two consequences for equality of voice. 
First, where campaigns concentrate their efforts influences who turns out to 
vote. Campaigns mobilize voters both as a direct strategy—through get-out-
the-vote efforts—and as an indirect consequence of the excitement and 
commitment they generate. Indeed, the closely-fought 2004 campaign 
stimulated the largest increase in voter turnout in four decades, a gain of 5.8 
percentage points over 2000. The increase, however, was concentrated in the 
battleground states. Every one of the ten states still “in play” in October—as 
judged by advertising buys—posted increases in voter participation that well 
exceeded the national average.  
Second, where campaigns concentrate their efforts affects who sets the 
campaigns’ issue agendas. As a first-term president, George W. Bush departed 
from Republican free-trade principles to impose duties on imported steel and 
softwood timber, actions of keen interest in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
Ohio, Washington, and Oregon. As a candidate in 2004, John Kerry found it 
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necessary to establish his bona fides as a friend of gun owners by taking 
time off from the campaign trail to hunt pheasants in Iowa. The Republicans 
allegedly whipped up gay marriage referenda to mobilize religious conser-
vatives in eleven states including Arkansas, Ohio, Michigan, and Oregon. To 
be sure, the parochial concerns of the swing states did not monopolize the 
two campaigns’ agendas; the war in Iraq, health care, and terrorism each 
received thorough discussion. Still, the Electoral College pushed the special 
concerns of voters in a handful of highly competitive states ahead of the 
concerns of the vast majority of the citizens whose misfortune it was not to 
live in Ohio or Iowa. 
In sum, the Electoral College violates the principle of equal voice that is 
fundamental to elections as an institution. It favors the preferences of some 
voters over others by as much as a factor of four, based only on the happen-
stance of the population of the state in which they reside. Even more 
dramatically, it distorts the process by which presidential candidates attend 
to the wishes of the voters. The Electoral College encourages—yea, de-
mands—that candidates attach nearly exclusive importance to the 
preferences and involvement of voters living in closely divided states.  
II. Proposals for Electoral College Reform
The consideration of equal voice is essential to evaluating the different 
proposals for Electoral College reform. Reforms can hardly be justified 
apart from their effects on equality, a paramount value in a democracy. 
Equality is particularly important in discussing the most likely prospect for 
reform: awarding two “senatorial” electoral votes to the overall winner of 
the state as well as one electoral vote to the popular vote winner within each 
of the state’s congressional districts. By aligning the electoral vote more 
closely with the popular vote in each state, the proposal would appear to 
improve the prospects for equal voice. But the proposal contains less for 
political equality than meets the eye. 
First, in a purely mechanical sense, the proposal to allocate electoral 
votes by congressional district does nothing to address the existing bias in 
favor of voters in less populated states. Every state still gets a minimum of 
three electoral votes, even tiny Wyoming, with a voting-eligible population 
about the size of Denver’s.  
Worse, by making little difference in the states with the smallest popula-
tions, the proposal may in fact aggravate the bias against voters in the states 
with large populations. It would not alter the winner-take-all method of allo-
cation for the eight states with a single statewide congressional district and 
three electoral votes. Moreover, the partisan balances in smaller states are so 
lopsided that only six of the thirteen states with four to six electoral votes 
might actually split them.  
But in the states with the largest populations, the proposal would have a 
greater effect—probably for the negative. The reform might bring competi-
tion to areas that are not now contested at the state level, as I will discuss 
momentarily. But in the more populous states that are currently competitive in 
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presidential elections, the proposal would markedly reduce their value as a 
prize and diminish campaigns’ willingness to invest their resources there. 
Were electoral votes allocated by congressional district, the one-sided parti-
san composition of most districts would cause Democrats and Republicans 
to compete for eight rather than twenty-seven electoral votes in Florida and 
for five rather than ten electoral votes in Wisconsin. The winner-take-all 
tradition of the Electoral College took hold precisely as a strategy to in-
crease individual states’ leverage in the presidential election process. 
Allocating electoral votes by congressional district would diminish the in-
fluence of highly populated states far more than less-populated states and in 
that way affect the more populous states—and equality of voice—for the 
worse. 
On the other hand, one might assume that putting congressional districts 
into play would encourage presidential candidates to broaden the reach of 
their campaign efforts to include more people in more places, thus stimulat-
ing voter turnout and attending to more numerous and more diverse 
constituencies. Perhaps it would. But such an improvement in competitive-
ness—and in political equality—is hardly guaranteed.  
Suppose, to make a back-of-the-envelope calculation, that we take as a 
measure of competitiveness a presidential election decided by a plurality of 
less than ten percent of votes cast. By this standard, twenty-one states with 
264 total electoral votes were competitive in the 2004 election, and indeed, 
twenty-two states—mostly, but not entirely, the same ones—drew the atten-
tion of campaign advertisers at some point in the 2004 campaign.  
Against this standard, what might have been the effect of a rule to award 
one electoral vote for each congressional district and two for each state in 
the 2004 election? George W. Bush and John Kerry ran within ten percent-
age points of each other in ninety-five of the 435 congressional districts. 
Sixty-three of the ninety-five competitive districts were in states that were 
already competitive according to the ten point standard, leaving just thirty-
two districts in which campaigns might have invested resources they did not 
put into the state. Among the thirty-two, of course, were significant numbers 
of districts in states that drew absolutely no attention in the 2004 campaign, 
including nine (of twenty-nine) in New York, five (of nineteen) in Illinois, 
three (of five) in Connecticut, and three (of five) in Arizona. By this meas-
ure, the proposed reform would have increased the number of electoral votes 
in play by about twelve percent. 
While the campaigns might step up their activities in the thirty-two 
newly competitive congressional districts under the proposed rule, they 
might equally reduce their efforts in the twenty-one states that had been 
competitive under the old rule. As already noted, the abolition of winner-
take-all vastly diminishes the value of winning each state, from, for in-
stance, 20 electoral votes to 2 for Ohio, or collectively, from 264 electoral 
votes in 21 competitive states to 42. Further, because the overwhelming ma-
jority of congressional districts are uncompetitive even in two-party 
competitive states, the proposed allocation also would drastically narrow the 
field in which campaigns need to make intense efforts to win votes. The 
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campaigns might take the resources formerly devoted to intense efforts to 
win 264 electoral votes in 21 competitive states and turn them instead to 
concerted efforts to win 95 competitive congressional districts with real but 
diminished efforts to win 42 senatorial electoral votes in the 21 competitive 
states. By this reckoning, the proposed reform would have reduced contesta-
tion by as much as forty-eight percent in 2004. Thus, it is by no means 
obvious that this step is in the right direction, either for competition or for 
equality. 
Conclusion 
This analysis suggests that the equality central to democratic theory and 
democratic practice cannot be achieved by half measures. If we want every 
vote to count equally, the only solution is to elect the president by direct 
popular vote. The chief executive is the only officer of the federal govern-
ment who is responsible to the citizenry at large, and we cannot ensure 
equal responsiveness if one citizen’s vote counts for three or four times as 
much as another’s. Likewise, if we want every citizen to have an equal 
chance to enjoy the ministrations of at least one of the presidential candi-
dates, the only solution is to elect the president by direct popular vote. Only 
a national popular vote gives campaigns the incentive to seek support in 
places and among demographics they will probably lose—or win decisively. 
Were presidents elected by the nation at large, Democratic candidates would 
have a reason to campaign intensively among poor Latinos in south Texas, 
while Republicans would be motivated to appeal nationwide to Latinos who 
might be attracted by the party’s stand on social issues; similarly, Republi-
cans would have a reason to mobilize white-collar commuters in 
Connecticut, while Democrats would be motivated to rally the prairie popu-
lists who still dot the Great Plains.  
In short, citizens have equal voice only when every vote counts. And 
every vote counts only when candidates must seek support from all voters, 
no matter the partisan predispositions of their neighbors and no matter 
where they live. 
